An integrated, cost-constrained modernization roadmap was developed based on results of the 1999 IIA. Supporting roadmaps were built for requirements/CONOPS documentation, and policy and treaty issues.
This Chapter presents an integrated, time-phased, fiscally-constrained investment plan for achieving our Vision. The Chapter graphically depicts and describes the warfighting capabilities projected for new space and missile systems by the end of the near-, mid- and far-terms; summarizes the major Mission Support activities required to better support our missions; and provides the projected rolled-up costs of implementing the plan. Supporting roadmaps are also provided for requirements and CONOPS documentation, and policy and treaty actions. Finally, the importance of critical and enabling technologies to successfully implement the plan is discussed.
In this time of continued fiscal constraint, we can expect little to no growth in the Air Force budget. However, as space capabilities play an increasing role in the fully integrated Aerospace Force, AFSPC must receive an increasing portion of the Air Force Total Obligation Authority (TOA) to achieve our Vision.
Figure 6-1 depicts our assumed AFSPC TOA growth (in constant year FY00 dollars) compared to an Air Force TOA which has no growth beyond the end of the current FYDP (i.e., 2007). With the migration of some airborne and ground missions to space and possible cost sharing with other commands, agencies or Services for key programs, we consider this a realistic estimate of the needed space TOA growth.
With these assumptions, AFSPC TOA increases from approximately $8B in 2006 (12% of the USAF TOA) to about $14B midway through the 25-year period.
Figure 6-1: Assumed funding profile increases
To achieve our Vision, we must maintain and improve existing space and missile capabilities while investing in new capabilities. This section first presents the time-phased implementation of the Vision by describing the warfighting capabilities proposed by the plan during each of the near-, mid- and far-terms. The section then provides both an Integrated Modernization Roadmap and Mission Support Roadmap, followed by a cost roll-up highlighting the investment breakdown associated with implementing this plan. These investment roadmaps represent the results of the recently completed 2-year IPP.
Additionally, we identified five areas of emphasis that persist throughout the planning horizon. These are: (1) maintain strategic deterrence, (2) leverage partnerships, (3) reduce the cost of doing business, (4) protect and sustain forces and (5) support our installations and people. Though these areas remain priorities throughout the 25 years of the plan, we address them only in the near-term section, describing our efforts for each across the 25 years.
As explained in the preceding chapter, our implementation strategy for the near-term focuses on improving our C4ISR capabilities and evolving current core capabilities to better support the unified CINCs. We have identified four areas of emphasis as part of our near-term strategy. Specifically, we will work to: (1) improve battlespace situational awareness, (2) fully integrate our Aerospace Forces, (3) evolve our space superiority capabilities and (4) evolve our information superiority capabilities. Figure 6-2 depicts some of our key systems and capabilities available by the end of the near-term (i.e., 2007). It also identifies new or improved capabilities that will be added during this time frame.
Improve Battlespace Situational Awareness
Military operations throughout the 1990s have spanned much of the continuum of operations. From Desert Storm to Kosovo, from anti-terrorist strikes to disaster relief, US forces have been called upon for numerous, diverse actions in many previously “uncharted” areas. The utility of space systems, like GPS, that provide battlespace situational awareness has been immeasurable. Foreseeing no significant change in these trends over the next decade, AFSPC is intent on making air, land and sea forces even more effective.
A major improvement to battlespace situational awareness will be realized with the deployment of the Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS). SBIRS consists of a High (geosynchronous and highly elliptical orbits) and Low (LEO) components. The near-term will see the initial deployment of SBIRS High as the replacement for DSP as it phases out around 2010. SBIRS Low will deploy in the mid-term; it will maintain strategic missile warning capabilities and expand these capabilities to include theater missiles. SBIRS High will provide enhanced capabilities for launch detection, missile characterization, and launch and impact point predictions. It will also provide battlespace characterization and technical intelligence capabilities. These capabilities will allow theater commanders and the NCA greater flexibility to respond to ballistic missile threats. As SBIRS reaches full operational capability (FOC), additional research efforts will be underway to provide even greater ISR capabilities.
The next block upgrade to GPS will begin with the launch of a GPS IIF satellite in FY05. These satellites will incrementally improve the accuracy of space-based positioning and timing information. GPS IIF is also planned to significantly improve geolocation to space-based assets and signal protection capabilities.
Integrate Aerospace Forces
Central to effective integrated Aerospace Force operations is the connectivity between air and space forces. This issue revolves around C2 and ISR capabilities. The improvements to battlespace situational awareness, discussed above, are key contributors to the integration of Aerospace Forces. For maximum utility of such ISR information, the C2 connections must be seamless. This is the intent of the NORAD/USSPACECOM Warfighting Support System (N/UWSS) and the AFSPACE AOC. Cross-flowing information about space to the air C2 net, and vice versa, will enhance total C2 effectiveness. These efforts focus on the automated fusion of intelligence, combat planning, combat operations and battle staff information from multiple sources to provide greater understanding of the battlespace for C2 actions.
The integration of Aerospace Forces is not simply an issue of data flow or interoperability between systems. Changes in mindset, in doctrine and in how we train and educate our people are just as critical. Hence, we continue to advocate for integration of space into the core curricula of PME schools to teach how space systems affect strategic, operational and tactical warfighting. Mission Support’s Space Training Initiative will enhance AETC’s curriculum to improve training quality and reduce unit qualification training time. We will also continue to advocate for more space capabilities to be injected into war games and exercises.
Additionally, improved modeling and simulation tools are needed to accurately depict and assess the contributions of space capabilities to combined aerospace and joint operations. The establishment of the AFSPC Analysis Center, as part of the Modernization Planning/Aerospace Integration (MP/AI) Initiative, will help to “institutionalize” space-related MS&A capabilities. This will aid the integration of air and space forces by supporting integrated aerospace analyses, doctrine development and warfighter education. For example, MS&A will support the SAS and “white cell” in exercises to quantify the impacts of threats to space systems.
AFSPC, through the SWC, is standing up the SAS. The SAS will provide expertise and “red cell” team members during exercises; emulate space denial or negation efforts used by a particular adversary; show how enemy command, control and intelligence capabilities are enhanced by organic or commercial space systems; and validate the effectiveness of Operations Security (OPSEC) procedures against space sensors. The space aggressors will provide preparation and training to the AEF for dealing with adversary use of space.
Evolve Space Superiority
Gaining space superiority will become as important tomorrow as gaining air superiority is today. In the near-term, we will lay the foundation to gain full space superiority. The primary near-term focus is to improve our space surveillance capabilities. To do so, we will upgrade some of our existing ground-based space surveillance systems such as the Eglin radar and the GEODSS network, add capabilities with the completed relocation and upgrade of GLOBUS II and increase and optimize the use of other agencies’ sensors such as Shemya. Additionally, with the Satellite-as-a-Sensor concept, we will use telemetry data from existing satellite constellations to determine the scope and magnitude of attacks against US satellites. Also, we will provide improved space surveillance data fusion capabilities with Intelligence Data Analysis System for Satellites (IDASS) which will be incorporated into the N/UWSS architecture.
Evolve Information Superiority
To eventually achieve information superiority, we must do more than provide the information needed by our combatant commanders. We must develop a full spectrum of capabilities to gain, exploit, defend or attack information and information systems. In the near-term, in addition to gaining and exploiting information, we will focus on defending our information and information systems by improving our DCI capabilities. We plan to fully define, and then implement, a robust Information Assurance Architecture. To do so, we plan to develop a cadre of personnel, mostly outsourced, to perform DCI assessments and install appropriate COTS or GFE software providing DCI operation capabilities for our major ground segments and facilities. A small contingent of Air Force/government personnel will manage and direct the program.
Maintain Strategic Deterrence
As we expand our space capabilities, we must also maintain the effectiveness of our strategic deterrent forces. This capability will play a role key to national security and sovereignty throughout the 25-year planning horizon. Hence, based on NCA direction for START II implementation and future force needs, the ICBM force capabilities will be sustained. Peacekeeper ICBMs are slated to be retired under the START II treaty. However, as the Russians continue to delay ratifying START II, we continue to sustain Peacekeeper on a year-by-year basis. To effectively plan for Peacekeeper sustainment, this SMP now plans sustainment for 10 years.
The Minuteman III fleet will continue to undergo modifications and life extension through efforts such as the Guidance Replacement Program (GRP), Propulsion Replacement Program (PRP), Propulsion System Rocket Engine (PSRE) and Environmental Control System programs. Numerous programs will configure the Minuteman III force for START II compliance and increase its reliability, safety and surety. Additionally, the Rapid Execution and Combat Targeting (REACT) Service Life Extension Program will ensure the critical hardware and software interface of the C2 system remains viable.
To maintain the ICBM weapon systems as a credible deterrent to a hostile attack requires an extremely high confidence in the command, control and communications (C3) systems providing connectivity to the NCA. To ensure that the ICBMs can be executed in all manner of hostile environments requires assured, survivable, secure communications channels to the Launch Control Centers. While assured connectivity is mandated for ICBMs, ways must be found to make the C3 systems cost efficient. Continuing studies are needed to identify existing and future technologies and concepts that exploit state-of-the-art communications and information transfer techniques that will guarantee the required C3 support to the current ICBM mission and those ICBM systems and missions that will evolve in the 21st century. The C3 application program funds efforts to accomplish studies, demonstrations and tests to ensure that future ICBM C3 architectures, networks and systems evolve in a planned, orderly and cost-efficient manner while meeting the stringent requirements of strategic command and control.
Security Forces modernization will continue throughout the planning horizon to maintain a safe and secure nuclear strike capability. This modernization will include Delay and Denial Technology development, Personal Alarm System acquisition, Armored Security Vehicle replacement, Helicopter sustainment and enhancements to anti-terrorism/force protection (AT/FP) equipment and tactics.
Finally, we will invest in the Ballistic Missile Requirements (BMR) program to maintain our strategic deterrent forces through the far-term. Minuteman III ICBMs will begin to age out around 2020. The BMR study, initiated under the ICBM Long-range Requirements Planning program, is examining options that include another Minuteman life extension program, a new missile system and a variety of other concepts which may meet future Force Applications requirements.
The plan we have outlined in this SMP is costly. One area for potentially significant cost savings is the leveraging of partnerships. AFSPC currently works closely with the NRO and NASA through the AFSPC-NRO-NASA Partnership Council to share insights and technology efforts. This relationship makes for a more efficient use of resources and time to field advanced systems to meet theater CINC battlespace situational awareness requirements sooner than would be possible if AFSPC pursued these capabilities independently. Similarly, NASA has the lead for reusable launch vehicle technology. This technology will feed AFSPC efforts in the mid- and far-terms for advanced and responsive launch vehicles. Also, the Air Force and NASA will be partnering on the development of the Space-Based Laser (SBL) primary mirror, since the Next Generation Space Telescope primary mirror will be similar in size and will precede SBL’s development.
In addition, the Space Support non-materiel solution entitled, “Evaluate Merging Various Government-Owned Satellite Operations Infrastructures” (shown in Figure ES-4, and Figure 6–6, as “NMS 3”), involves evaluating merging various government-owned satellite operations infrastructures to create a single, agreed-upon government-owned “supra network” to enable select satellite operations services. This evaluation will exploit the National Security Space Architect’s ongoing satellite operations Architecture Development Team and Transition Team Study efforts, as well as the soon-to-be-published CSOS results.
Another example of partnership to make needed space capabilities affordable is with a space-based ground moving target indicator (GMTI) system. Current SBR GMTI concepts are too expensive for AFSPC to develop on its own. We have included SBR GMTI in our plan with an operational capability planned for the far-term. We envision this will be a joint effort with other organizations such as BMDO or the other Services. The planned costs included in the cost roll-up associated with SBR, therefore, only reflect our expected share of the costs of a joint effort.
Leveraging of commercial capabilities is a major initiative being pursued in the near-term. Areas under current consideration include launch vehicles, launch ranges (possibly evolving to “spaceports”), communications and weather. Of particular near-term interest are the areas of launch and satellite operations. Within the last 5 years, an unprecedented transformation has occurred. Private enterprise now commands a larger percentage of the customer launch base than does the US government. In addition, the launch and satellite industries now offer products and services that are driven by commercial demand instead of government investment. The difficulty rests in quantifying the overall utility and cost savings of using commercial systems to fill AFSPC mission needs. The primary motivator for commercialization is the potential for great cost savings. However, we must weigh potential cost savings against other factors such as (1) the potential impact to the end user – combatant commanders, (2) loss of military control of the system, (3) the potential impact to the Air Force’s ability to train and retain competent launch and satellite operators and (4) the operational benefits to be gained. The AFSPC challenge is to identify and exploit the commercial opportunities where it makes sense and to invest government dollars where no commercial customer base is present and may not become present in the foreseeable future.
Three Space Support non-materiel solutions call for evaluating commercial and cost-savings opportunities. The first entitled, “Evaluate Greater Exploitation of Commercial Spacelift Opportunities (shown in Figure ES-4, and Figure 6–6, as “NMS 1”) involves evaluating greater exploitation of commercial spacelift opportunities above and beyond the Evolved Expendable Launch Vehicle (EELV). AFSPC should closely follow and document both the expendable and reusable commercial launch vehicle efforts currently underway. The next two entitled, “Evaluate Launch Operations Infrastructure Ownership/Operations Alternatives” and “Evaluate Satellite Operations Infrastructure Ownership/Operations Alternatives” (shown in Figure ES-4, and Figure 6–6, as “NMS 2" and "NMS 4" respectively) involve evaluating alternatives for transitioning launch and/or satellite operations infrastructure ownership and operations to Reserve/Guard components, other Federal or State government agencies or commercial industry. A prime evaluation criterion will be ensuring that military control be maintained over all transitioned infrastructures, as deemed necessary. It is by no mean a foregone conclusion that a transition (in whole or part) is the right thing to do. However, since there are a multitude of launch and satellite operations studies being performed outside of AFSPC, the time is right to conduct internal proactive studies of our own. In this way, AFSPC can determine how to balance cost savings with the four factors mentioned in the preceding paragraph. The Space Support MAP describes the non-materiel solutions in greater detail.
Finally, we are looking at better ways to optimize our total force mix. (See Appendix B for details.)
Reduce the Cost of Doing Business
While leveraging partnerships and commercialization offer potential savings, we must also look at ways to reduce the costs of the capabilities and services we currently provide. First and foremost are launch costs. The EELV will begin operations during the near-term with the first medium-lift EELV scheduled for launch in 2002. This family of launch vehicles is “evolved” because it will take many of its design features from existing, flight tested launch systems and components and combine them into a new system. This will have the effect of helping to decrease development cost while maintaining high system reliability. The goal for EELV is to significantly reduce current launch costs. As platforms are standardized for compatibility with the various payloads, changes in how we do business with satellite development are also warranted, leading towards a “load and launch” approach. Standard interfaces between launch vehicles and satellites will help select the launch vehicle based on availability and mission profile. Shortened preparation times for launch will also be pursued. These changes will be inserted into design guidelines of planned satellites throughout the entire planning horizon.
We will also work to make launch operations more cost-effective and efficient. The SLRS’s RSA program will standardize and modernize the Eastern and Western Ranges to enhance range operability while reducing costs. Additionally, the potential for launch and on-orbit operations cost reductions can occur in the mid- and far-term with the deployment of reusable capabilities such as the Space Operations Vehicle (SOV) and the Space Maneuver Vehicle (SMV).
Efforts to reduce O&M costs are underway. The current AFSCN is aging and costly to maintain. Satellite Control Network Sustainment will significantly reduce O&M costs by replacing antiquated equipment. The standardization and consolidation of stovepiped C2 systems via development of N/UWSS and the upgrades to the ICBM fleet for improved reliability will also reduce O&M costs. Far-term concepts such as Autonomous Ground and Satellite Operations and Future Satellite Control System have the potential to reduce O&M costs even further.
Protect and Sustain Forces
As threats to our space and missile capabilities grow, we will provide the specialized training and equipment required to protect and sustain our forces. Our plan includes initiatives for enhancing our AT/FP capabilities, performing vulnerability assessments on our space and missile ground sites and re-evaluating our current protection measures for space.
Support Installations and People
To “Provide the 21st century aerospace warrior and required infrastructure” called for by our Mission Support Vision End State, we have planned funding increases to support a number of our Mission Support functional areas. Funding increases for Civil Engineering efforts such as military construction (MILCON), Real Property Maintenance Activities (RPMA) and housing; C&I efforts such as flexible C&I infrastructure and increased communications bandwidth; and Logistics initiatives will provide much needed support for our installations throughout the planning period. Likewise, STEDE’s DMT and Space Training Initiative and Medical initiatives will help train and sustain our “21st century aerospace warrior.”
During the mid-term, we will enhance our ability to defend and protect our critical space capabilities. Our emphasis during the mid-term is in four areas: (1) improving battlespace management, (2) evolving global conventional strike, (3) gaining space superiority and (4) gaining information superiority. The first two will provide more effective use of the entire battlespace. The last two will allow US and Allied forces to protect vital military, civil and commercial space assets and information, prevent any potential adversary from exploiting our capabilities, and negate a potential adversary’s own space capabilities. Figure 6-3 shows some of the key systems and capabilities available by the end of the mid-term (i.e., 2013).
Improve Battlespace Management
AFSPC will deploy new military SATCOM systems during the mid-term, providing better C2 of all Aerospace Forces. The Advanced EHF system will replace Milstar and provide near-global, protected communications. Objective Polar MILSATCOM satellites will complete the EHF network to provide protected communications to US and Allied warfighting forces nearly anywhere on the globe. Wideband Gapfiller will be a commercial-like capability with first launch in the near-term and full deployment in the mid-term. Wideband Gapfiller will augment and replace DSCS satellites and GBS Phase 2 and will include two-way Ka-band broadcast. Wideband Gapfiller and the future Advanced Wideband (SHF/Ka) will both include Phase 3 of the GBS providing improved, high-capacity communications.
Improved ISR capabilities will also be deployed during the mid-term to be integrated with other aerospace ISR capabilities. The linkage of airborne sensors, such as Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) and Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS), with various NRO platforms and space systems could provide the unified CINCs with the most robust ISR picture to date. Although our ability to collect data will be at an all-time high, challenges persist in the tasking, processing, exploitation and dissemination (TPED) arena. AFSPC contributions will include SBIRS Low satellites. The versatility of SBIRS Low will not only provide greater situational awareness for missile warning and tracking, but can also provide limited information about other airborne threats as well as augment surveillance of the space environment.
During the mid-term, we will also better manage the collection and dissemination of weather data in support of military operations. Deployment of the National Polar-orbiting Operational Environmental Satellite System (NPOESS) will converge the Air Force DMSP and the NOAA POES into a single, integrated national program, another example of our ongoing efforts to leverage partnerships. NPOESS, combined with a series of advanced space environment sensors to be deployed in both the mid- and far-terms, will provide US and Allied forces with improved terrestrial and space environment information vital to mission planning. Augmentations to NPOESS to expand key measurements and improve timeliness and refresh rates of terrestrial information were not affordable in this plan.
Finally, we will field improved space asset deployment capabilities such as the SMV, Orbit Transfer Vehicle (OTV) and microsat buses, further improving our ability to manage the battlespace. The SMV will be a reusable, unmanned orbiting vehicle with integral propulsion that completes an on-orbit mission and then re-enters the atmosphere and lands for re-tasking. Because it is not designed to attain orbit on its own, it will be deployed as a payload from either an expendable or reusable launch vehicle (e.g., EELV, SOV). The OTV will be an upper stage capable of delivering a payload to any desired orbit. Once launched, the OTV could remain on-orbit to ferry new payloads to mission orbits or could be discarded. The OTV could also provide on-orbit servicing, repair, repositioning and rescue of marooned (i.e., assets that failed to achieve final mission orbit) space assets. Also, microsat buses will be available to carry a variety of payloads and can be more easily and economically deployed than satellites using larger buses.
Evolve Global, Conventional Strike
During the mid-term, we will expand the options available to our warfighting commanders by fielding an initial global Conventional Strike capability. The Common Aero Vehicle (CAV) will evolve from the High-Speed Precision Penetrator (HSPP) and CAV demos planned for the near-term. CAV will provide warfighting forces with a Conventional Strike capability with near-global range, prompt response time from launch to target, penetration of hostile natural or man-made terrestrial and atmospheric environments and enemy defense avoidance. The CAV system will be capable of dispensing a variety of munitions against ground targets to include WMD storage sites, C2 facilities, maritime forces and massed ground forces.
Gain Space Superiority
A significant portion of our efforts in the mid-term will be focused on gaining control of the “high ground.” With the magnitude of our growing dependence on space capabilities by this timeframe, and the extent of commercial efforts that will have firmly established space as a center of gravity, it will be paramount to ensure freedom of operations in space.
To that end, we will provide commanders with total space situational awareness by developing and deploying space-based space surveillance systems while evaluating the benefit of maintaining and upgrading most of our existing ground-based systems. Such situational awareness is needed to effectively operate in space, enabling the full range of Space Control capabilities. The Space-Based Electro-Optical Network (SBEON), Microsat Payload Imager and Haystack Ultra-Wideband Satellite Imaging Radar (HUSIR) will combine with the previously deployed GLOBUS II to provide a greater capability to detect, track, identify, characterize and catalog space objects. These capabilities will greatly improve our ability to monitor all space activities, to include assessments of friendly assets maneuvering through space, as well as monitoring the space activities of potential adversaries. These latter insights will drastically improve actual characterization of an adversary’s intentions, and enable potentially taking active or passive measures to counter those intentions.
In the mid-term, we will also focus on protecting space assets. Developed during the near-term, the Satellite Threat Warning and Attack Reporting System (STW&ARS) will be fielded and carried on-board DoD satellites for detection and geo-location of radio frequency (RF) and laser threats and attacks. STW&ARS will also allow for communication of information about interference and attacks to key C2 centers (including the owner/operator and the appropriate counterspace command authority). We will also field advanced satellite link, bus and electro-optical (EO) payload protection capabilities to counter enemy attacks against DoD satellites and prevent their unauthorized use.
Finally, fielding a Mobile RF Jammer and Relocatable Laser Blinder during the mid-term will give theater CINCs the initial capabilities to neutralize adversary space use.
Gain Information Superiority
During the mid-term, our Information Assurance Architecture, integrated into the N/UWSS architecture, will reach FOC, rounding out our DCI capabilities and providing the foundation for OCI through the development of computer network attack capabilities. In addition, some of our proposed counterspace systems provide initial OCI capabilities as we strive to gain information superiority.
During the far-term we will strive to fully achieve our vision end state. The far-term will focus more on offensive capabilities. Our strategy emphasizes our efforts to: (1) provide global, real-time situational awareness; (2) provide prompt, global conventional strike; (3) maintain space superiority and (4) maintain information superiority. Figure 6-4 highlights the planned capabilities and systems for the far-term.
Provide Global, Real-time Situational Awareness
As situational awareness has evolved throughout the entire 25-year planning horizon, capabilities have focused primarily on either specific threats or improved awareness of the aerospace environments in which forces operate. In the far-term, we will concentrate our efforts on surveillance of potential targets. We plan to deploy an SBR GMTI capability developed as a joint effort between AFSPC and other organizations such as BMDO or the other Services. SBR GMTI will provide the capability to find, fix and track surface targets. We desired to include a space-based Air Moving Target Indicator (AMTI) capability in this plan; however, our investment analysis demonstrated that current space-based AMTI concepts are too costly for our already aggressive plan. The addition of an AMTI capability to SBR sometime after the end of the planning horizon would allow the Air Force to migrate some or all of the synthetic aperture radar/moving target indicator functions of the AWACS and the JSTARS to space-based platforms. Compared to these airborne systems, a complete SBR capability would increase coverage area and availability (potential for nearly continuous worldwide coverage), to include denied-area access, while reducing the problems due to terrain masking, personnel risk and the logistical costs relative to current airborne systems.
Our plan also calls for the addition of a LEO Hyperspectral Target Characterization System during the far-term. The Hyperspectral Imagery (HSI) capability provided by such a system enables the ability to monitor a broad spectrum of targets to aid global, real-time situational awareness. These include chemical, hard and deeply buried, and camouflaged and concealed targets. This information will also assist in formulating selective targeting options in a crisis while supporting treaty and armistice monitoring.
Far-term improvements to SATCOM and space-based positioning and timing will also help us in providing global, real-time situational awareness to our combatant commanders. During the far-term we will deploy Advanced EHF Follow-On, Objective Polar MILSATCOM Replenishment and Advanced Wideband SATCOM networks to further improve our connectivity to and between our joint forces. Additionally, a modernized GPS network will provide our unified CINCs with highly accurate and secure, global, real-time positioning and timing information.
Provide Prompt, Global, Conventional Strike
Achievement of our vision end state will provide the NCA with a new array of political and military options in the course of evolving crises. The ability to halt an enemy’s operations within hours, minutes, or even seconds, rests with providing a prompt, global, conventional strike capability. The far-term addition of an SOV, combined with CAV, will provide warfighting forces with improved and more flexible conventional strike capabilities. Moreover, space-based directed energy weapons systems, such as the SBL, will offer US and Allied forces revolutionary air superiority and global attack advantages in speed, range and response time over all terrestrial systems. The SBL capability for rapid global strike against space and airborne targets will give the US a formidable military advantage. The combination of SBL, along with SOV assets delivering the CAV, provides a complete range of prompt, global, conventional strike options to the future NCA.
Maintain Space Superiority
During the mid-term, we will have begun to gain control of the “high ground” through various improvements in space surveillance and deployment of initial counterspace capabilities. During the far-term, we will field the capabilities needed to maintain space superiority. These include: improved launch and satellite operations systems that provide on-demand space transportation and space asset operations, additional counterspace options that will allow our theater CINCs to neutralize threatening use of space by our adversaries, and an NMD capability to protect the US from a limited nuclear attack in a world with continued proliferation of nuclear weapons and missile technologies and systems.
In the far-term, we will deploy several Space Support capabilities that will complement the SMV and OTV deployed in the mid-term to provide on-demand space transportation and space asset operations.
A Two-Stage-To-Orbit (TSTO) SOV will be a reusable, quick turnaround, global or orbital payload delivery system (i.e., reusable launch vehicle) capable of delivery within hours of notification. After the SOV TSTO becomes operational, we will decide whether to pursue development of a Single-Stage-To-Orbit (SSTO) SOV.
Modular On-Orbit Servicing will extend the on-orbit service lives of space assets, while the Space-Based Launch Range (SBLR) will complement the traditional terrestrial range infrastructure, resulting in an increase in the number of range activities that can be supported during a given time period.
An Autonomous Ground and Satellite Operations capability will automate tasks currently performed by government or contractor personnel and will build into our space assets "awareness" so that they are more autonomous than today's satellites. This will drastically reduce the manning levels and associated resources required to operate our space assets. Also, the Future Satellite Control System will allow the space operator to communicate with an on-orbit space asset anywhere at any time. This is possible if we migrate from today's ground-based infrastructure to a mix of space- and ground-based assets. The resulting communication path from the operator to the space asset will be transparent to both. In combination, the Future Satellite Control System and the Autonomous Ground and Satellite Operations concepts represent the Next Generation Space Asset Operations capability needed to support the satellite operations Vision end state.
With these new Space Support capabilities, it may be more appropriate to shift from a CONOPS that uses on-orbit spares to one of rapid launch-on-need and replenishment. Less than 100% day-to-day coverage and revisit rates in certain regions may be acceptable if timely SOV insertion of additional platforms could augment day-to-day capabilities to meet the needs of an evolving crisis. All such options would be worked in conjunction with future satellite configurations and designs to determine the most effective operations and sustainment CONOPS.
Ground-based jammers (Navigation Jammer and Downlink Mission Jammer) and the Orbit Flexible Counterspace Microsat will give our theater CINCs improved capabilities to neutralize the adversary’s use of space. Finally, assuming resolution of treaty and policy issues, an SBL system will be developed and deployed during the far-term providing counterspace negation of adversarial space capabilities, if deemed appropriate, and an NMD capability to protect the US from a limited nuclear attack.
Just as air supremacy provides today’s commander with freedom of action on the earth, space supremacy, achieved by dominating space via these systems, will provide tomorrow’s commander with freedom of action on or above the earth.
Maintain Information Superiority
We will continue to develop our Information Assurance Architecture to counter growing threats. OCI will remain an area of great interest; however, additional planning is required.
Figures 6–5 through 6–8 summarize our 25-year modernization roadmap for acquiring the capabilities discussed in this chapter. This roadmap is integrated across all mission areas and highlights existing programs as well as new concepts. As shown in the legend, colors and shadings differentiate between systems that are operational or in development and those that are currently funded or planned. Key milestone dates are highlighted by diamonds. As an example, Figure 6-5 shows that development of SBIRS High is currently funded with the first launch scheduled for 2005 and FOC planned for 2009. The roadmap entry for the LEO Hyperspectral Target Characterization System shows an example of a planned program with development scheduled to begin in 2010 resulting in an FOC around 2018.
In addition to developing the materiel solutions described in this chapter, the Mission Area Teams also generated non-materiel solutions that have the potential for satisfying some mission needs. A complete list of all NMSs can be found in the MAPs. Over the next several months, each Mission Area Team will determine which of their non-materiel solutions should be carried forward to implementation.
Figure 6-5: Force Enhancement modernization roadmap represents results of the IPP
Figure 6-6: Space Support modernization roadmap represents results of the IPP
Figure 6-7: Space Control modernization roadmap represents results of the IPP
Figure 6-8: Force Applications modernization roadmap represents results of the IPP
Figure 6-9 presents our fiscally-constrained Mission Support Roadmap. Assumed Mission Support funding growth used to develop the roadmap is discussed in Sec. 6.2.6. The roadmap depicted in this figure shows the affordable upgrades and changes to basic support infrastructure we have identified to address the Mission Support Needs summarized in Chapter 4. Many of the programs shown on the roadmap are currently ongoing. Our plan calls for increased funding in these areas to satisfy the Needs and evolve toward our Vision end state. Although the Medical initiatives depicted on the roadmap are separately funded by the DoD DHP, they are included here to highlight the importance of these initiatives to AFSPC.
Figure 6-9: Mission Support Roadmap represents results of the IPP
Figure 6-10 displays a roll-up of the total cost for the integrated plan presented above. Total investments in each mission area are shown. The “Other Programs” category represents funding judged to be not available for investment trade-offs. Costs include the total life cycle costs of new investments as well as the O&M costs of existing systems and infrastructure. The “Assumed Space TOA” line in Figure 6-10 represents the projected TOA presented earlier in Figure 6-1. It is used as the funding constraint for our Integrated Phased Implementation Plan. This TOA line represents fairly rapid mid-term growth, but levels off by 2015.
As indicated in the figure, this plan assumes Mission Support funding will grow from its current level of approximately $1B annually to just over $3B by 2025. This growth is needed to support the expanded mission area capabilities depicted in the modernization roadmap.
Figure 6-10 shows that virtually the entirety of our Integrated Phased Implementation Plan is funded within our assumed TOA. As proposed in the 1998 SMP, program plans and spending profiles were reassessed and adjusted allowing us to develop a plan that fits within this projected TOA. This investment strategy forms the nucleus of our inputs to the Air Force Planning Projection, the APPG and other corporate Air Force outyear planning activities.
Figure 6-10: AFSPC’s plan is
costly but provides capabilities
essential to 21st century warfighting
Transitioning a concept or solution to an Air Force acquisition program requires a set of validated requirements documents including Mission Needs Statements (MNS), Operational Requirements Documents (ORD) and CONOPS. A MNS describes a high-level set of needs to perform a particular mission. The MNS must be completed and approved prior to beginning concept exploration (i.e., Milestone 0). MNS are no longer required for ACAT II and III if the need is documented in the MAPs. AFSPC will be required to prepare a briefing, in lieu of MNS, for presentation to the Air Force Requirements Oversight Council (AFROC). The AFROC (AF/XOR) will prepare a memorandum (AFROCM) approving the command to go right to studies and development of an ORD. More specific operational requirements are provided in the ORD. The ORD must be completed before Milestone I, the approval to begin a new acquisition program. The ORD is reviewed at subsequent milestone decision points based on cost-schedule-performance trade-offs during the preceding phase of the acquisition process. A CONOPS is also needed to define how the user intends to operate and employ the system in conjunction with other existing and projected Air Force and/or joint systems to execute the mission.
Based on the results of MNA and MSA, we developed recommendations for time-phasing of these formal requirements documents. Requirements and CONOPS documents needed during the near-term are identified in Figure 6-11. The timing of these documents was based on the assumption of a one year lead-in MNS development prior to Milestone 0. We then assumed an average of 3 years between Milestone 0 and Milestone I, which provides time for CONOPS development, an Analysis of Alternatives (AoA), and the ORD development, coordination and approval cycle. For solutions which are planned to become operational within the next 5 years, and do not already have an approved MNS, ORD or CONOPS, we assumed an FY02 completion deadline.
Figure 6-11: Requirements and CONOPS roadmap
To fully develop and exploit potential Space Control and space-based Force Applications capabilities, some policies and treaties will need to be modified by the NCA and Congress. Specifically, the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty and US policy and doctrine need to be reviewed before the deployment of any space-based counterspace capability. Further, since the SOV and CAV are capable of carrying conventional, non-nuclear weapons in and through space, a policy evaluation and decision is needed on these systems as well. Figure 6-12 presents a basic roadmap of the policy and treaty actions with respect to future system capabilities the US will need to take to permit the full implementation of this plan, if deemed appropriate by the NCA.
Figure 6-12: US policies and treaties in need of revision
There are presently no formal US policies preventing development or deployment of Counterspace capabilities. In actuality, the President’s National Space Policy and the Secretary of Defense’s policy on Space Control both require development of “negation” capabilities and deployment as needed to ensure freedom of access and operations in space. However, NCA approval will be required for any employment of force against adversary space assets.
The major question in fielding OCS systems is the political will to do so. It should be noted that the START, ABM and other treaties prohibit “interference with National Technical Means of Verification.” While not prohibiting OCS weapons, this prohibition does limit potential targets.
As stated in Article 5 of the ABM Treaty, “Each party undertakes not to develop, test, or deploy ABM systems or components which are sea-based, air-based, space-based, or mobile land-based.” Further clarified in the Second Agreed Statement of September 26, 1997, relating to the ABM Treaty, “the parties also agreed not to develop, test, or deploy space-based Theater Missile Defense (TMD) interceptor missiles or space-based components based on other physical principles such as lasers that are capable of substituting for space-based TMD interceptor missiles.” The Unilateral Statement B of the ABM Treaty states that, “while prohibiting testing of non-ABM components for ABM purposes: (the treaty does not intend) to prevent testing of ABM components, and not to prevent testing of non-ABM components for non-ABM purposes.”
While the US can continue with the research portion of the SBL, the US cannot deploy an operational SBL without violating the treaty as it exists today. To allow an SBL development decision, the US would have to withdraw from the ABM Treaty or renegotiate its restrictions. This needs to be accomplished by 2012 before major EMD funding for SBL begins.
Another system with potential treaty implications is SBIRS Low. SBIRS Low requirements and preliminary design will be formally submitted for review by the Compliance Review Group (CRG) following the SBIRS Low Preliminary Design Review in FY02. Prior to this formal review, the CRG will perform periodic reviews of the developing SBIRS Low program. Of note, SBIRS High received CRG approval in Sep 99.
Our Vision calls for space-based systems with the capability to directly apply force from space against terrestrial targets. International treaties and laws do not totally prohibit the use or presence of weapons in space. The Outer Space Treaty of 1967 prohibits only nuclear weapons and other WMD from being placed into Earth’s orbit, installed on celestial bodies, or otherwise stationed in space. Other types of weapons cannot be tested on celestial bodies, but the Treaty does not otherwise specifically prohibit their use in space.
The National Aeronautics and Space Act of 1958 states that it is US policy “that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful purposes for the benefit of all mankind.” In addition, the Outer Space Treaty also states that the moon and other celestial bodies shall be used only for peaceful purposes. While “peaceful purposes” is not defined, the US has historically interpreted the phrase to mean that “non-aggressive, non-hostile” activities are permitted. This interpretation is not universally accepted. Nevertheless, the majority of countries, including the US, interpret the “peaceful purposes” clause of the Outer Space Treaty in light of Article 51 of the UN Charter. Article 51 of the UN Charter specifically recognized the inherent right of national self-defense. Under this majority interpretation, since some space assets might be critical to national security, their defense and the use of offensive force in space for self defense should be deemed authorized. For perspective, the "Coalition" went into Iraq under Article 51. The US is then left with a decision whether or not to pursue the development and deployment of conventional, space-based systems for global strike to fully exploit the advantages of space (e.g., SBL, SOV, SMV, CAV, etc). As illustrated in Figure 6-12, we would have to make this decision prior to a CAV, SOV, SMV or SBL development decision.
The US has agreed to eliminate its multiple reentry vehicle Peacekeeper ICBMs as part of START II. Peacekeeper deactivation, however, may be delayed until the Russian government ratifies START II. The US plans to retrofit Minuteman III ICBMs with Safety Enhanced Reentry Vehicles (SERV) to maintain an effective ICBM arsenal.
Underpinning the capabilities identified in the Integrated Phase Implementation Plan is the availability of critical and enabling technologies. The S&T community must, therefore, be an integral player in the planning process.
In FY97, AFRL and AFSPC jointly developed Integrated Technology Roadmaps and Transition Plans for nine high priority concepts. This was the first attempt to time-phase laboratory efforts to meet projected AFSPC system capabilities and priorities while applying technological constraints to AFSPC planning. During the FY98-99 MSA phase, technology availability was considered in setting Initial Operational Capability (IOC) dates for the candidate concepts.
Generally, those technologies that enable the highest priority capabilities become high priorities for application of S&T resources. However, not all high priority concepts require significant technology development. In some cases the acquisition program is nearing the production phase, allowing for S&T efforts to be focused upon solving a few very specific issues. Therefore, the far-term prioritized capabilities, presented in Section 8–2, should be used as baseline guidance from AFSPC to the S&T community for long range planning and development of future Technology Roadmaps and Transition Plans.
In addition to the specific capabilities shown on the far-term priority list, AFRL is pursuing other revolutionary concepts. These technology innovations are examining next-generation sensor concepts, such as Ultra-Spectral Imagery and space-based Light Detection and Ranging (LIDAR). Other initiatives address processing required for the output of such sensors, such as automatic target recognition and multi-sensor fusion/correlation algorithms. These concepts are innovative applications, integrating a number of discreet technology development programs into militarily useful capabilities. These efforts are crucial to better addressing outstanding needs and accelerating the solutions for these needs. As illustrated in Chapter 7, a number of needs are only partially satisfied by solutions in this modernization plan, or not satisfied until the far-term. Technology development to assist the detection of camouflaged, concealed, or deceptive targets and sub-surface targets are of particular value.
Other technology development efforts underway within NASA and commercial industry have significant military utility. We seek to leverage a multitude of these supporting satellite technology developments. Of particular interest are more capable lightweight power generation, micro electro-mechanical systems, propulsion, multi-functional structures, signal processing, etc. These technology developments are applicable across the spectrum of space missions and will enhance the capabilities of future generations of space systems. Through increased partnering with NASA and commercial industry on these enabling technologies, AFRL can focus resources on developing technologies with military-unique applications.
Executive Summary Table Of Contents
Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9
Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F